The Use of Foreign Examples in Research Policy: Public Funding for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology in France by Louvel, Séverine & Hubert, Matthieu Pierre
 
  
The use of foreign examples in research policy
Public funding for nanoscience and nanotechnology in France
Séverine Louvel, Matthieu Hubert, Translated by Peter Hamilton





The English version of this issue is published thanks to the support of the CNRS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
This document is the English version of:
Séverine Louvel, Matthieu Hubert, Translated by Peter Hamilton, «L’usage des exemples étrangers dans les politiques de financement





How to cite this article:
Séverine Louvel, Matthieu Hubert, Translated by Peter Hamilton, «L’usage des exemples étrangers dans les politiques de financement
de la recherche», Revue française de sociologie 2016/3 (Vol. 57) , p. 473-501
 
Electronic distribution by Cairn on behalf of Presses de Sciences Po.
© Presses de Sciences Po. All rights reserved for all countries.  
 
Reproducing this article (including by photocopying) is only authorized in accordance with the general terms and conditions of use for
the website, or with the general terms and conditions of the license held by your institution, where applicable. Any other reproduction,
in full or in part, or storage in a database, in any form and by any means whatsoever is strictly prohibited without the prior written
consent of the publisher, except where permitted under French law.   






































































Translated by Peter Hamilton with the 
support of CNRS-INSHS.
 1. Research and innovation policies became 
institutionalized after the Second World War in 
most industrialized countries. They refer to the 
way in which States, as well as infra- or supra-
national actors (institutions, local authorities, 
international organizations) use scientific and 
technological means in the service of political, 
economic and social objectives (Henriques and 
Larédo 2013).
 2. Speech made by the French Minister of 
Higher Education and Research, 4 July 2011.
The Use of Foreign Examples in  
Research Policy




Abstract. This article examines the influence of major international paradigms on 
nanoscience and nanotechnology funding policies (nanoS & T ) pursued in France 
during the 2000s (1999–2013). It is concerned with how foreign examples become 
exemplary (in the sense of “exemplar” as used by Kuhn 1990) to the extent of being 
regarded as public policy solutions. Using extensive qualitative research in the field of 
nanoS & T, the article shows that the paradigmatic value of foreign examples derives 
from the processes of “editing” (Sahlin and Wedlin 2008), i.e., de-contextualization and 
re-contextualization which establishes their relevance for certain dimensions of sci-
ence policy. It highlights three key approaches to this editing work—one which creates 
an example of a prototype for public policy, one that lists comparable examples more 
systematically to define a concept, and finally one which borrows from management 
techniques—and identifies the key actors in the development of national programmes 
and the creation of local innovation clusters in nanoS & T.
Keywords. Foreign exampLes—nanosciences and nanotecHnoLogy—pubLic poLicy 
paradigm—pubLic researcH—researcH and innovation poLicy—researcH Funding 
Foreign examples are frequently used to justify the research and innovation 
policies1 carried out in France. Thus, the national programme of “investments for 
the future” (Programme des Investissements d’Avenir) was presented as an “MIT 
à la française”2 and the parliamentary discussions that preceded the reforms of 
the French research system in 2005 questioned the “lessons to be drawn from a 
foreign model” (the United States) (Périssol 2004). In addition, the branding of 71 
competitiveness clusters aimed at promoting synergies between academic research 
and industry appears to be a French version of such clusters flourishing in all techno-
logically advanced countries (Blanc 2004). These foreign examples embody in their 
discourses international research and innovation policy paradigms that define the 
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available. In this sense, they are presented as “standard examples” or “exemplars” 
defined as “solutions to concrete problems, accepted by the group as paradigmatic, 
in the ordinary sense of the term” (Kuhn 1990, p. 397).3 However, beyond mere 
rhetoric, the question arises of how some foreign examples become exemplary and 
guide decision-making in the funding of research.
This article proposes to study the process of “editing” (Sahlin and Wedlin 2008) 
of foreign examples, in other words the processes of decontextualization and recon-
textualisation by which certain actors involved in scientific policies are able to place 
them in a national or local context. It aims to answer the following questions: which 
actors can construct the paradigmatic value of certain foreign examples? By whom, 
for what purpose and with what consequences are these “edited” examples thus de-
ployed? These questions are particularly sensitive in a part of the public sector where 
both national and local policies must take into account the highly internationalized 
nature of scientific activities and are at the crossroads of seemingly contradictory 
rationales: on the one hand, in terms of the internationalization of the scientific elite, 
international competition for research and innovation, uncertainty about the most 
effective science policies to adopt are all factors that can foster mimicry between 
countries and the dissemination of ideas in occupational networks (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983); but, on the other hand, the great diversity of the instruments used for 
financing research4 demonstrates the absence of universal “recipes” in this area.
Although it is often asked, the question of the use of foreign examples in sci-
entific policies has been little studied. It re-energizes some classic questions in 
sociology5 about the understanding of the interorganizational, intersectorial or inter-
national circulation processes of practices and ideas. Some authors explain this cir-
culation by the morphology of social networks that link “promoters” and “adopters” 
(Coleman et al. 1966, Burt 1987).6 Others point out that ideas in circulation have 
gained international legitimacy in societies marked by forms of cultural homogeni-
zation (Strang and Meyer 1993). These approaches criticize a diffusionist view of 
the circulation of ideas and practices (based on direct exchanges) and highlight in-
ternational organizations (Godin 2002), peer networks (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) 
or epistemic communities (Haas 1992) which constitute the range of sites for the 
construction of the legitimacy of the ideas and the processes of their diffusion. They 
have been used to report on the circulation of instruments (indicators, norms, good 
practices, etc.) such as “institutional rules” (Meyer and Rowan 1977) or “scripts” 
that provide general and unformalized prescriptions (Meyer, et al. 2007). This cir-
culation of instruments or scripts is often based on an example that embodies them, 
 3. Thomas S. Kuhn (1990) proposes the no-
tion of exemplar to remove the ambiguities of 
the term paradigm (Kuhn 1972). He defines a 
paradigm as a “disciplinary matrix” in three 
dimensions: “symbolic generalizations” (such 
as definitions and laws), “heuristic models” 
and “exemplars”. T. S. Kuhn (1990) would pre-
fer to replace the notion of paradigm with that 
of disciplinary matrix, and to reserve the term 
paradigm for “exemplars”.
 4. That we observe both in terms of project 
financing (Lepori et al. 2007) and the creation 
of local clusters (Bresnahan et al. 2001).
 5. Especially in sociology of organizations, 
political sociology or sociology of innovation. 
In political science, policy transfer studies 
pose similar questions (Dolowitz and Marsh 
1996, Delpeuch 2008).
 6. For example, the classic study of the dif-
fusion of the prescription of tetracycline among 
physicians (Coleman et al. 1966). Reanalysis of 
the data by R. S. Burt (1987) shows that the dif-
fusion is stronger between practitioners in po-
sition of structural equivalence in the network 
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whether in the form of a success story (Strang and Macy 2001) or by reference to a 
leading country (Haveman 1993).
This article looks at the role of foreign examples in the adoption and imple-
mentation of financing policies by focusing on a particular area: nanosciences and 
nanotechnologies (nanoS & T) (see Box 1). As a result, the changes discussed are 
probably less open and controversial than those concerning the global architecture 
of the research system7 that are likely to initiate a paradigm shift (Hall 1993, p. 282).
In addition, some local nanoS & T support policies appear to be inspired by 
American examples (Massachusetts Institute of Technology—MIT, California 
Institute of Technology—Caltech, etc.).
Finally, the article focuses on the nanoS & T support policies adopted in France 
between 1999 and 2013.9 It is based on research materials (semi-structured inter-
views and archives) collected between 2005 and 2015 concerning the national and 
local components of these policies. The authors collected them within the context 
Box 1.—The main scientific and technological issues of nanoS & T
For the last thirty years, the nanosciences and nanotechnologies (nanoS & T) have been 
the subject of numerous studies in physics, chemistry, biology, engineering sciences and also 
at the interfaces of these disciplines. They arouse high expectations because of the particular 
properties of matter at the nanoscale (the millionth of a millimetre). From a scientific point of 
view, this research concerns the fabrication, observation, manipulation and modeling of nano-
objects, as well as the understanding of their properties and interactions with the environment. 
From an industrial point of view, they make it possible to create a wide range of applications 
in the fields of energy, materials, biomedicine, computer science and telecommunications. 
They have also been criticized for the risks they pose to health, the environment, the respect 
of privacy or the possibilities of transformation of the human species (Agence Nationale de 
la Recherche; French National Research Agency 2012).
The almost simultaneous emergence in the world of what are described as “nano” poli-
cies with generally similar architectures (Larédo et al. 2010) makes this sector particularly 
relevant for studying the use of foreign examples in funding for research. Moreover, France 
lends itself particularly well to such questioning. It made nanoS & T a priority in the early 
2000s, and constitutes an active contributor to the field (2nd in Europe and 6th in the world 
in numbers of publications over the period 1991–2005 [Kostoff et al. 2007]). Launched in 
2005, the main national project funding programme (the P-Nano Program of the National 
Research Agency) complies with international standards in this area and has similar goals to 
programmes launched in most countries in the OECD.8 
 7. For example, the creation of the French 
Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR) in 
2005, which entailed the import of project man-
agement and evaluation techniques from the 
US National Science Foundation; the launch of 
the “Investments for the Future” (programme 
des investissements d’avenir) programme pre-
pared by a report by two former French prime 
ministers, which abounds with references to 
world-class “campuses of excellence” (Juppé 
and Rocard 2009).
 8. These national programmes combine five 
objectives: development of research, infrastruc-
ture, training, technology transfer and “respon-
sible innovation” (Larédo et al. 2010, p. 48).
 9. In 1999 the first national programme in 
nanoS & T was launched (the RMNT). In 2013, 
the ANR’s “nano” programme disappeared in 
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Box 2.—Resources and methods
This article is based on research materials that the two authors have collected since 2005 
on nanoS & T policies in France (1999–2013), in the context of several studies: a doctor-
ate in sociology examined in 2009 (survey conducted in Grenoble between 2005 and 2009, 
ANR Lodysénano) (Hubert 2014, Hubert et al. 2014), and post-doctoral research (survey con-
ducted in the Paris region in 2010, ANR Nano-Innov) (Hubert et al. 2012), ANR project 
(survey conducted in Toulouse, Grenoble and the Paris region between 2010 and 2013, ANR 
Hybridtrajectories) (Louvel 2015 2016), and finally, a targeted survey conducted in 2015. It 
uses the survey results relating to the national and local nanoS & T funding policies. 
1) At the national level
- Contractual and competitive financing of projects (unspecified or thematic) since 1999 
by the Ministry in charge of research (under different titles) then the National Research 
Agency from 2005 to 2013;
- The financing of shared resources (instruments, buildings and experimental infrastruc-
tures) within the network of large technological platforms for basic technological research 
(RTB network);
- The financing of programmes to promote “responsible innovation,” through considera-
tions of its ethical and social consequences and public participation (“Nanos et Société (Nano 
and Society)” activities of the P-Nano and Nano-Innov programmes; by the Commission 
Nationale du Débat Public (National Commission for Public Debate)).
The analysis of national policy is based on approximately 25 interviews with successive 
programme managers and members of the programme committees (5 interviews conducted 
between 2005 and 2010—ANR Lodysénano and Nano-Innov, 7 interviews conducted between 
2010 and 2013—ANR Hybridtrajectories 13 interviews conducted in 2015, some with actors 
already interviewed), and on the analysis of archives (reports of programme committee meet-
ings, calls for projects, official reports, etc.).
2) At the local level
The financing of two innovation campuses in Grenoble: MINATEC (specialized in micro 
and nanoS & T); GIANT (which brings together nanoS & T, energy and health sciences).
The analysis of this local component is based on interviews and observations carried 
out in Grenoble between 2005 and 2009 (as part of a doctorate in sociology) plus three field 
surveys (interviews, observations, collection of archive material) conducted between 2009 
and 2011 in the context of Masters dissertations (Genin 2011; Libersa 2011; Polo 2009) and 
6 interviews conducted in 2015 with managers of local centres and programmes, as well as 
with initiators of international benchmarks.
The survey conducted in 2015 sought to limit post-interview reconstruction bias in several 
ways. We systematically compared the points of view of several actors for each aspect of the 
policy and for each period studied; we asked interviewed actors to comment on the previ-
ously collected archives, as well as on the comments made (by themselves or by other actors) 
during previous interviews.
of a number of surveys conducted in Grenoble, Toulouse and the Paris region (see 
Box 2).
The first section reviews contemporary paradigms in research and innovation 
policies, in the sense of a “matrix” (Kuhn 1972) or a “framework” (Hall 1993), as 
well as the sociological questions raised by how they are manifested by certain ex-
amples—in particular, how, with which actors and with what content do these acquire 
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(Sahlin and Wedlin 2008), through which some examples have been used in French 
policies aimed at organizing the national coordination of nanoS & T and the setting 
up of local innovation poles. We differentiate between three major approaches to this 
process: one that describes a foreign example in order to establish it as a prototype 
for public action (prototypical editing), another that lists comparable examples to 
define a concept (comparative editing), and a final one that borrows from a particular 
management tool (mimetic editing). These approaches produce three complementary 
forms of internationalization of science policies for nanoS & T and differ both in the 
content of what circulates among countries and in the actors and networks of this 
process of internationalisation.
An erosion of the national policy framework for 
research and innovation?
The advent of major international paradigms
The research and innovation policies that have been institutionalized since the 
end of the Second World War are part of major international paradigms that emerged 
successively10 and are now combined in national, but also infra- and supranational, 
policies. These paradigms are understood as “disciplinary matrices” (Kuhn 1990, 
p.  396) or as systems of ideas and instruments (Hall 1993, p. 279) that propose a 
set of relatively consensual problems and solutions. They are based on propositions 
stemming from philosophy (for example, the freedom of science, the place of sci-
ence in democracy) and political economy (for example, the definition of science as a 
public good) as well as on instruments for measuring science and its impact (Borràs 
and Biegelbauer 2003).
In the 1960s, the OECD was a major player in the emergence of a paradigm 
where it is the central State that identifies and coordinates priorities (Henriques 
and Larédo 2013).11 This paradigm is opposed to that of the “Republic of Science” 
characterized by a lack of national coordination and the full autonomy of the agen-
cies that fund scientific communities (Elzinga and Jamison 1995). For two decades 
it inspired the policies of member countries through the national assessments that 
the OECD conducts. Its adoption was facilitated by a reference to the United States 
that combines “a dialectic of the example, the model and the threat” (Bouchard 
2007, p. 17) and relies on the construction of a statistical apparatus (Godin 2002). 
This paradigm has been amended since the 1960s, but it still guides national policies 
in many OECD countries where, for example, national strategies follow planning 
exercises. On the other hand, the policies of funding agencies—which are growing 
everywhere—are defined in interaction with scientific communities (Van der Meulen 
 10. The very use of the terms “scientific pol-
icy” then “research policy” and “research and 
innovation policy” is concomitant with the ad-
vent of international paradigms in this area 
(Pestre and Jacq 1996).
 11. In emerging countries, international or-
ganizations (the World Bank and some regional 
organizations) have played an important role in 
disseminating institutional models in which 
the contribution of science and technology 
to development depends on State action (In-
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and Rip 1998) but respect national priorities.12 Finally, the European Research Area 
has been translated into a limited Europeanisation of the agendas of the agencies 
and organizations of the member countries (Larédo 2009, p. 29).
This paradigm has been challenged, since the 1970s, by a conception of research 
and innovation policy that emphasizes coordination by networks in order to foster 
innovation (Ulnicane 2015). This second paradigm postulates that innovations stem 
neither from freely conducted scientific research nor from technological priorities 
defined by the State, but from “interaction loops” that public bodies must facilitate 
and protect.13 Its application has taken two directions: the reorientation of national 
policies towards the financing of collaborative research linking academic and indus-
trial actors (for example, the “labelling” and financing in France of competitiveness 
clusters and of the Carnot Institute network for partnership research); the weakening 
of national policies for the benefit of subnational levels (especially local authori-
ties financing innovation poles within objectives designed to increase regional at-
tractiveness) and supranational levels (for example, the European Union) as well as 
industrial strategies.14
Embodied paradigms? The process of editing foreign examples
Why (and for which actors) do some foreign examples appear to be answers to 
the central questions of scientific policy paradigms (the “independence” of experts, 
the “transparency” of evaluation, the “competitiveness” of calls for projects, etc.)? 
Devised to analyze how local politicians use examples when creating a science park 
in the Stockholm region (Sahlin-Anderson 1996), the notion of “editing” has been 
taken up and developed to describe social processes of selection and reappropriation 
through which knowledge flows (Sahlin and Wedlin 2008).
The purpose of editing is to write and shape “versions” of this knowledge, in 
other words, reformulations that take them out of their original situation and re-
position them into a context of action. As with the notion of translation (Callon 
1986), it focuses on the transformation of ideas and examples as they circulate and 
is opposed to diffusionist approaches (Rogers 2003). However, the perspective is 
distinctly different from the sociology of “translation” because it focuses on the 
social constraints of decontextualization and recontextualisation that weigh on “edi-
tors” (managers, decision makers and reformers, but also, depending on the case, 
social partners, representatives of civil society, consultants, media, international or-
ganizations, etc.) when they are choosing examples and producing “versions.” In 
this perspective, the analysis of these constraints is mainly influenced by decision 
theories—which emphasize the limited rationality of the actors and the constraints 
of meaning and plausibility that weigh on their actions—and institutional sociology 
 12. With the notable exception of the Na-
tional Science Foundation, the leading federal 
funding agency in the USA (Kleinman 1994).
 13. This paradigm has been the subject of 
a major literature in the social sciences: Tri-
ple Helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1997); 
Mode 2 transdisciplinary research (Gibbons 
et al. 1995); clusters (Porter 1998); national 
and local innovation systems (Lundvall 2010). 
In particular, the “Triple Helix” model, which 
describes the relationships between public 
authorities, companies and universities and 
their role in innovation dynamics, has been 
discussed in many places (Shinn 2002): NSF, 
CNRS, OECD, NATO, European Commission, 
Emerging Market Authorities.
 14. This paradigm can be linked to the “Net-
work governance” narrative (Ferlie et al. 2008) 
presented as an essential source of inspiration 
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(conformism, identification rationales, social legitimacy of certain ideas, etc.) (Sahlin 
and Wedlin 2008).
The editing of foreign examples in French policies for 
nanoS & T
Some policies for nanoS & T put into place in other countries give rise, in 
France, to versions produced by a group of editors (parliamentarians, scientists, con-
sulting firms, embassy scientific attachés, civil servants of the ministry in charge 
of research, leaders and managers of research programmes). The writing of these 
versions and their use in scientific policies takes three forms. First, they are part of 
a rationale that uses the description of an example as a prototype for public sector 
action. Editing takes place here in independent activities concerned with forecasting 
and recommendation in the field of science policy. It feeds into the general think-
ing of ministerial decision-makers and research institutions rather than providing a 
policy solution. After this, editing aims to define a concept of public action based on 
the systematic comparison of several examples and their benchmark. It is produced 
by political advisers who use this concept for its ability to arouse interest, convince 
and build consensus. Finally, the writing of versions is part of a mimetic rationale 
for identifying problems and similar solutions in other countries in order to replicate 
them in the national context. The editors here are policy makers (programme or 
platform managers) looking for operational answers and management tools.
Prototypical editing: the National Nanotechnology Initiative, 
prototype of a major programme for nanoS & T
In France, unlike other countries, the American National Nanotechnology 
Initiative (NNI), launched in 2001, was not an inspiration for the launch of the 
national policy for nanoS & T.15 However, references to the NNI were multiplying 
from 2002. They were part of monitoring and forecasting studies in the field of sci-
ence policy and came from various editors: senators of the French Parliamentary 
office for technology assessment (OPECST 2003, 2004), civil servants and advisers 
in the administration (Ministry of Youth, Education and Research 2004, Roure and 
Dupuy 2004), scientific institutions or collectives (Academy of Technology 2002, 
Academies of Science and Technology 2004, Bernier et al. 2005), consulting firms 
(Carlac’h and Hemery 2004), officials in the French Embassy in the United States 
(Herino 2005). Inspired by the same official sources,16 these reports describe in very 
 15. French programmes date from the late 
1990s or early 2000s: Réseau des Micro et Na-
notechnologies [Micro and Nanotechnologies 
Network] (1999); Action Concertée Incitative 
Nanosciences [Concerted Incentive Action on 
Nanosciences] (2002); RTB network (2003) 
(ANR 2012, p.17). These initiatives respond 
to the investment and resource concentration 
needs identified by the international scientific 
communities, but are not inspired by, or even 
predated by, foreign examples. They inherit a 
French institutional pattern organized around 
autonomous institutions and which tradition-
ally divides the roles between “fundamental” 
research (mainly under the aegis of the CNRS) 
and “technological” research (mainly under the 
aegis of the CEA).
 16. Presentations and reviews by government 
agencies such as the National Research Coun-































































Séverine LouveL, Matthieu Hubert 
Revue française de sociologie, 57-3, 2016, 321
similar terms the NNI as the prototype of a “great programme” for nanoS & T un-
paralleled in the world,17 whereas it is in fact more of a “forum” that coordinates the 
programming of some fifteen independent agencies (National Science Foundation, 
National Institutes of Health, Department of Energy, etc.), which freely use their 
funds to finance projects in nanoS & T (Reillon 2011, p. 19). They identify this major 
programme by characteristic features that they describe as issues that are important 
to provide a national response (pooling resources, coordinating initiatives and fund-
ing, proposing a “vision” for “responsible” development of science and technology).
Report writers use the NNI in two types of arguments.18 While these fuelled lively 
scientific policy debates at this time, they had very little influence over nanoS & T 
funding decisions. First of all, the reference to the “major American programme” aims 
to give some urgency to the thorny issue of interinstitutional coordination between 
research operators (CEA, CNRS, universities, etc.) that is not specific to nanoS & T 
but crucial in this transversal field. The reports of OPECST and the Academies of 
Science and Technology propose the creation of a “French NNI” in the form of a ma-
jor inter-ministerial programme: the “NanoTech programme” (OPECST 2004, p.112) 
or the “National Agency for Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies” (Academies of 
Science and Technology 2004: pp. XXXIII–XXXIV). They justify the importance 
of “taking the initiative of a major programme” (ibid.) by using the rhetoric of a 
“geo-comparativist lag” (Bouchard 2007) in relation to the United States. This gives 
weight to the “critical mass” argument, according to which only a national or even 
European action plan19 could finance investment in nanoS & T (OPECST 2004). 
Although the leaders of the nanoS & T programmes in public research institutions 
did not intend to create a “French NNI,” this proposal contributed to recurrent ques-
tioning over the institutional arrangements that would allow the large-scale action of 
the “State as facilitator” of cooperation between research organisations (Lanciano-
Morandat and Verdier 2005), to which the project of the national funding agency 
provided a global response:20  “Indeed there were these 2004 reports. It was a rec-
ommendation but not a political decision of the institutions. But, finally, what was 
happening on the nanos was very general. The ANR had it on the drawing board 
and this idea of a  major transversal nanos programme had materialized within the 
ANR. That was the answer to the multiplication of institutional layers” (Head of 
department at the CEA then head of the “matière et information” department at the 
ANR from 2005 to 2009). The national programme for nanoS & T created in 2005 
at the ANR merged the previous initiatives without being inspired by the organiza-
tion of the NNI. It was less a question of taking up foreign strategic agendas than of 
retaining a sufficiently broad definition of nanoS & T to structure interdisciplinary 
communities, in a situation where the strong growth of the ANR’s budgets ensured 
 17  “With $ 14 billion invested, the NNI is 
now the largest federal funding program for R 
& R since the space program” (Reillon 2011, 
p. 1).
 18. All the reports quoted above insist on the 
first type of argument, the second being of vari-
able geometry.
 19. The term “critical mass” appears eleven 
times in a European Commission communi-
cation entitled “Towards a European strategy 
for nanoS & T”, 12 May 2004, 30 pages. The 
reference to the United States appears twenty 
times. In addition, French investments are of-
ten compared to those of the “two predominant 
poles” that are the United States and Japan 
(Ministère de la Jeunesse, de l’Éducation Na-
tionale et de la Recherche 2004).
 20. The French Délégation Générale à la Re-
cherche Scientifique et Technique [General 
Delegation for Scientific and Technical Re-
search] played this role in the 1970s, but with 
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a certain durability of the programme (2005–2008).21 With this in mind, the P-Nano 
programme funded a large share of exploratory research (on the basis of very large 
tenders) and aimed to “detect weak signals” within scientific communities.22
Secondly, some reports (OPECST 2004, 2006, Roure and Dupuy 2004, Ministry 
of Ecology and Sustainable Development 2006) refer to the NNI’s promotion of 
the “responsible development” of nanoS & T (in other words, research which at an 
early stage includes the analysis of health and environmental risks as well as social 
and ethical questions). They use this reference in particular to support the financing, 
in France, of research in the humanities and social sciences: “It should be noted, 
however, that 1% of the federal sums allocated to nanotechnology research must go 
[NB: in the NNI] to research on social and ethical implications. [...] It is therefore 
expected that in this area too, the US will take the lead.” (Roure and Dupuy 2004, 
pp. 28–9). In particular, the report of Françoise Roure and Jean-Pierre Dupuy (ibid.) 
highlights a European “vision” of the use of nanoS & T directly opposed to the “vi-
sion” of the NNI which is of transhumanist inspiration.23 However, ANR’s scientific 
programming includes the issue of science-society relations almost exclusively in 
response to local and national issues. Indeed, research on the risks and the “impacts” 
on society were mainly financed in reaction to radical protests that were gaining 
momentum throughout the decade: firstly in Grenoble24, then nationally, with the 
disruption or the impediment of a good part of the public meetings organized by 
the Commission Particulière du Débat Public. The head of the ANR’s “Materials 
and Information” department chose to involve scientific researchers in SHS (trs. 
sciences humaines et sociales; social and human sciences) with some critical actors 
in civil society25 who, although they shared the same rejection of the transhumanist 
vision of the NNI and of an instrumentalisation of the SHS in the service of the 
“acceptability” of nanoS & T, diverged strongly in terms of their understanding 
of science-society relations (education, communication, debate or co-construction): 
 21. P-Nano is attached to the “materials and 
information” department of the ANR. It has a 
budget of 35 million euros. P-Nano funds all 
research that “targets the construction, study, 
or manipulation of structures, systems, or ob-
jects that are typically less than 100 nm in size 
and whose physical, chemical, or biological 
properties are specifically derived from that 
nanoscale size.” 
 22. Notes from a participant in the P-Nano 
Sectoral Scientific Committee, at the meet-
ing of April 3, 2008, describing the analysis 
of all submitted projects (including those re-
jected) with a view to identifying emerging 
themes. The sectoral scientific committees 
are advisory bodies that “inform the scien-
tific programming of the ANR” (Guide to 
the organization and functioning of a sectoral 
committee, May 10, 2007, document ANR / 
GUI-AMu-MG-100507-01- 01).
 23.  Transhumanism advocates the use of sci-
ence and technology to improve the physical 
and cognitive performance of humans. The 
NNI coordinator (Mr Roco) promoted SHS re-
search and dialogue between researchers and 
the “public” to overcome social resistance to 
the project (Roco and Bainbridge 2002). The 
European vision was formalized in the Nord-
mann report (2004) at the request of the Fore-
sight Division of the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Research. It empha-
sizes the co-construction of science and tech-
nology, the goals of social welfare, and the 
driving role of SHS (Nordmann 2009, p. 291). 
This vision guided the design of the science-
society dialogue by the European Commission 
(see European Commission Communication, 
“Towards a European strategy for nanoS & T”, 
12 May 2004, p.3).
 24.  Especially the criticism coming from the 
Grenoble group PMO (Pièces et main-d’œuvre; 
Parts and Labour), which intensified with the 
approach of the inauguration of MINATEC in 
2006.
 25. Including the president of the public or-
ganisation “60 million consumers [60 millions 
de consommateurs]”, the president of the VivA-
gora NGO and the vice-president of the OECD 
working group on nanoS & T (co-author of the 
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“There were not many presidents of SHS in a committee on technological research. 
They (i.e. the officials of the ANR) had a terrible fear of arguments about nanos. 
What mattered was that we are able in this committee to have a dialogue about fu-
ture directions with people who encouraged a fairly critical vision.” (SHS researcher 
chairing the P-Nano Sector Committee from 2007 to 2009). In addition, the sectoral 
scientific committee’s discussions concerning the integration of SHS research into 
a hard science programme are running short, given the very limited number of 
responses to calls for tenders: “We had a small ethics and science committee. The 
problem was that the pool of people likely to present projects on nanos and society 
was very limited. And very soon the potential project leaders were in the committee 
and we played musical chairs. Whoever wanted to introduce a project resigned from 
the committee” (SHS researcher member of the P-Nano Sector Committee in 2008).
Thus a version of the NNI example was established around 2002–2004 in reports 
that rely essentially on the publicly available and summary information contained 
in the US programme documents. It fed into the evaluation and foresight exercises 
that were multiplying to not only support the growth of nanoS & T but also to 
reflect more generally on the changes in the national research system. It made the 
NNI a prototype for public action, highlighting issues of resource pooling, interin-
stitutional coordination and for encouraging “responsible” research. On these dif-
ferent subjects, the nanoS & T, by their interdisciplinary and transversal nature, are 
presented as an emblematic sector of the major issues facing all national policies. 
By its very nature, this editing process has had very weak direct effects on science 
policy. Indeed, it simultaneously highlights the similarity of the questions and the 
diversity of the answers adopted, thus favouring discourses that, while comparing 
systems, simultaneously warn of the impossibility of transposing foreign solutions. 
The identification of common issues with the undisputed leader in nanoS & T did not 
lead to imitation, but fed into a broader policy debate (Dobbin et al. 2007, p. 453).
Comparative Editing: Defining the Innovation Campus Concept
A second form of the editing process systematically compares several examples to 
highlight the characteristics that explain their success. The examples are thus “theo-
rized” (in the sense that causal relations are formulated from them, see Strang and 
Meyer 1993, 492) to arrive at the definition of a concept supposed to guide public 
action. This form of editing is directly connected to the construction of the argu-
ment in favour of a science policy. It combines identity issues (such as inclusion in a 
small club of world-class campuses) with operational objectives (obtaining funding, 
building international partnerships). It is the process carried out by strategy and com-
munication advisers that science policy makers choose to select the examples, define 
the concept, mediate it, and build its articulation with the project to be carried out.
The construction of the Grenoble centre for innovation in nanoS & T (MINATEC 
and GIANT programmes)26 is explicitly based on the definition of such a concept, 
that of an innovation campus. This definition is supported by an international 
 26. MINATEC (trademark registered in 2001 by the CEA, the French Alternative Energies and 
Atomic Energy Commission) is an “innovation campus” (or science park) in the field of micro- 
and nanotechnologies inaugurated in 2006. The GIANT project extended the MINATEC principle 
from 2006, initially bringing together 6,000 researchers on nanotechnologies, energy and health, 
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comparison of an atypical magnitude and clearly presented as a “benchmark,” in 
other words as a work of identification of exemplary cases with which to compare 
and explain differences in performance. In the early 2000s, the director of projects 
(Jean Therme, then director at the CEA LETI)27 appointed a scientific advisor to 
work on such plans, who was commissioned to spend ten years on a “tour” of scien-
tific and technical centres throughout the world (involving over sixty visits to more 
than twenty countries) (Morabito 2014). Chosen because he was not involved with 
any of the institutions concerned (including the CEA) and his “fresh” perspective 
on a question on which he was not a specialist, Marcel Morabito (professor of law, 
former rector of the Academy of Grenoble) produced four successive benchmark 
studies concerned with: the governance of the main centres of excellence in na-
notechnology; the impacts of the 2008 economic crisis on these centres; emerging 
countries; and the links between research and industry. These benchmarking studies 
benefitted from the logistical support of the CEA’s communication services, and also 
of MINATEC (technology watch, organization of “tours,” etc.) and the technical 
expertise of LETI members (including the director of MINATEC, who took part in 
some of the foreign visits).
While emphasizing, with the help of agro-ecological metaphors (soil, ecosystem, 
cross-fertilization, culture, etc.), the complexity and the non-reproducible nature of 
the successes observed abroad, these benchmarks led to an international definition 
of the innovation campus. First, it is defined in cultural terms. The importance of 
entrepreneurial culture is fully embodied in the figure of the scientific and institu-
tional entrepreneur, whose individual leadership leads to success (Morabito 2014, 
p. 60). Second, international examples are reduced to a few basic principles. These 
constitute “templates” or frameworks for evaluating activities (Sahlin and Wedlin 
2008, p. 231); they offer a grammar of project development, without venturing to 
deliver ready-made recipes. These principles are essentially part of a rationale of 
decompartmentalization, accessibility and integration. They draw, for the innovation 
poles, the outline of a connectionist model (Boltanski et Chiapello 1999): “I went 
to present the main trends to the Presqu’ile committee:28 a grouping of skills and 
resources in physical ecosystems; a close connection between basic research and 
technological research; a desire to bring science and society together [...] Second, 
the architectural quality, corners of conviviality everywhere. And then the proximity 
between the actors” (Mr. Morabito). In this connectionist vision, common work-
places,29 associated with material infrastructures and a solid entrepreneurial culture, 
ensure the mixture of cultures that makes the major innovation clusters successful: 
“You need a unique crucible, and this crucible must be a melting pot in which disci-
plines, cultures, research styles meet to create innovation. This magical place is the 
scientific polygon” (J. Therme, speech at the commemoration of the 50th anniversary 
of CEA Grenoble, May 2006).
 27. Leti is the microelectronics laboratory of 
CEA Grenoble. With a staff of 1,700, it employs 
three quarters of those in minatec (source : 
http://www.leti.fr/en/Discover-Leti/About-us).
 28. The Presqu’île (“peninsula”) or the “sci-
entific polygon” refers to a geographical area 
located northwest of Grenoble, where, in the 
second half of the twentieth century, (public and 
private) research centres and large European 
projects were located. The “Presqu’île project” 
is led by a “partnership committee” chaired by 
the economic assistant of the city of Greno-
ble and two vice-presidents, including a local 
elected councilor and the director of CEA Gre-
noble (Jean Therme) (Libersa 2011, 73, 117).
 29. Jean Therme illustrates his public presen-
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By decontextualizing local projects and placing them within a more general 
definition of innovation campuses, promoters can relegate a local history of obsta-
cles, oppositions and controversies to the background (Hubert et al. 2014 83–95). 
Presented as a characteristic of major world campuses,30 the research/teaching link 
signifies the culmination of a project initiated in 1985 but blocked due to lack of 
funding. Similarly, the continuous dynamisation of “downstream” (innovation) by 
“upstream” (basic research) is a LETI response to the desire of the CEA manage-
ment to profoundly restructure its activities because they are deemed too close to 
those of the industrialists. Finally, the lack of a legal structure for MINATEC is 
presented as favouring the flexibility of partnerships and the reactivity of the ac-
tors (Libersa 2011, p.50). However, this was decided after the failure of a previous 
project (the Zone de Haute Technologie [High-Tech Zone], Delemarle 2007, p. 146) 
because of issues over location, but also of organization and distribution of powers. 
More broadly, the definition of a “MINATEC model” as a space for collaboration31 
disposes of governance issues, which are potentially conflictual and likely to block 
the rapprochement between the institutions concerned (Delemarle 2007, p. 164).
The MINATEC research teams welcome the definition of the concept of inno-
vation as an external communication operation which, as such, does not reflect any 
of the very concrete problems they encounter in pooling resources and strength-
ening their partnerships (Hubert 2014). While some researchers are ironic about 
the “Travelling salesman function” of the management team, they recognize its ef-
fectiveness. Locally, the strategic use of these benchmarks is something staged in 
numerous meetings:32 “All these trips had the objective of developing arguments 
with partners, elected officials, central authorities. When we developed the GIANT 
project in 2008, we went on the road with Jean Therme and the architect and we had 
a choir with three voices. I began by giving the international vision, Jean Therme 
explained to them “this is what we want to do on the local level” and the architect 
made aesthetic poetry out of the project that took shape” (Marcel Morabito). The ed-
iting of the concept of innovation campus also relies on the reference to prototypes.33 
In particular, among the examples likely to illustrate the fundamental characteristics 
of the campus of innovation, the promoters of MINATEC and GIANT regularly 
quoted the one best known by their audience: “Like MIT, we have a technopolis in 
the heart of a city. [...] We have critical mass, 120 hectares, 20,000 people, like MIT, 
and reception areas all around for businesses.” (Jean Therme, speech at the com-
memoration of the 50th anniversary of CEA Grenoble, May 2006).
 30. The director of MINATEC defines the 
campus as a “mini-ecosystem” of innovation 
created around its main technological and col-
laborative research laboratory, LETI, to which 
training components have been added (an en-
gineering school of the National Polytechnic 
Institute of Grenoble: Phelma), basic research 
(laboratories of the INPG and the Institute of 
Nanosciences and Cryogenics of the CEA and 
UJF) and companies (rental of premises and 
creation of joint research teams between in-
dustrialists and the CEA).
 31. “MINATEC is not a legal entity: it is only 
a site, a registered trademark and a method of 
organization based on an agreement signed by 
all the organizations present on the site, which 
provides for the appointment of a director and 
a steering committee.” (Guibert 2011).
 32. “The development of the strategy be-
hind MINATEC is contained in a set of 102 
presentations that span from the end of 1999 
to the beginning of 2002 (the signature of the 
MINATEC framework agreement).” (Dele-
marle 2007, 78). The argument is developed 
especially for local authorities that finance the 
150 million euros of buildings: http://www.mi-
natec.org/minatec.
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This definition of the innovation campus strikes a chord with elected officials 
and local manufacturers.34 Indeed, it fits quite conveniently into the continuity of 
shared interpretations of the success of previous projects. First of all, the unify-
ing figure of the entrepreneur is a very consensual one and was embodied in the 
twentieth century in the central role of the “three Louis’s” (Merlin, Néel and Weil) 
in local development (Libersa 2011, p. 58). Moreover, the supposed virtues of in-
novation campuses confirm the relevance of the “Grenoble model” as a historical 
precursor in the matter: “For more than 150 years, Grenoble has owed its success 
to a Grenoble ecosystem that connects research-university-industry, public and pri-
vate actors, in effective partnerships and as generators of innovation.”35 The idea 
appealed to local actors because it connected the “entrepreneurial city” which is 
characterized by “the discourse of competition and the market, including in terms 
of image and identity, the political priority given to economic development issues 
and the attraction of investment, of population flows and favoured social groups” 
(Le Galès 2003, p. 287). In the GIANT project, the link between the innovation 
campus and urban development serves a policy of attractiveness of the territory for 
internationally mobile actors (students, scientists, engineers). Moreover, beyond its 
contribution to the argument in favour of projects, the concept of innovation cam-
pus provides guidelines for their achievement: a visibility strategy (the definition of 
MINATEC as an “innovation campus”36, a big advertising budget, a dedicated team, 
the presentation of the activities required in order to reach the critical size of world 
centres37); a steering committee of international experts;38 architectural design and 
internal activities (aesthetic quality of buildings, spaces for conviviality, unifying 
events,39 construction of housing near the scientific quarter of the Presqu’île, at the 
confluence of the Drac and Isère rivers); public accessibility (opening of a visitor 
centre in 2010).40
The Innovation Campus concept is also used with international partners. It aims, 
initially, to include MINATEC and GIANT in the closed circle of world centres of 
excellence, and then, in a second stage, to take a leading role. This club rationale 
is not devoid of strategic ambitions, foreign counterparts being potential contrac-
tual partners.41 The many international visits (about 150 in total in fifteen years, 
within the framework of benchmarks and activities of the director of Minatec) make 
 34. Manufacturers do not directly finance 
MINATEC but contribute through the rental 
of workspaces and especially through collabo-
ration agreements with the site’s laboratories 
(LETI in particular).
 35  Editorial in the brochure Presqu’île sci-
entifique signed by the mayor of Grenoble and 
his deputy mayor for the economy.
 36  The very choice of the term “campus” 
stems from an analysis of terms used abroad 
and a desire to differentiate itself from the 
more technology-oriented technology park 
model.
 37. “We consolidate the budget of all partners 
present on the site for reasons of international 
visibility.” (Guibert 2011).
 38. Creation of a “visionary board” composed 
of 13 international experts on the model of 
some “committees of the wise” (for example, 
the advisory board of RIKEN in Japan).
 39. Including “MIDIS MINATEC”, weekly 
conferences followed by a buffet for 300 to 400 
people.
 40. The design of this space was based on 
a comparison of about 20 science or visitors’ 
centres of major international campuses. It fo-
cuses on informing visitors at the expense of 
activities where they could play a more active 
role and debate nanoS & T (Polo 2009).
 41. This goal is essential for LETI, for which 
75% of its budget comes from contract research. 
In this respect, the promotion of MINATEC 
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the work of the campus visible and present it as something avant-garde. They play 
the role of advertising campaigns that provide correctives for CEA’s image abroad 
(whose activities are often closely associated with nuclear power). The ambition of 
leading an international club was concretized in 2012 by the creation by GIANT 
of a “High Level Forum,” which includes 17 international delegations. Presented 
as a place of exchange of ideas around the concept of innovation campus,42 this 
event aimed to sustain the “community” identified during the benchmarks and to 
forge new partnerships: “When you have the chance to meet one of the founders of 
Apple or the director of the JPL,43 it would be absurd to lose these contacts. The 
more this community meets, the more friendships we create that lead to contracts. 
At the last High Level Forum, GIANT and NIMS, which is the National Institute 
of Materials Science in Japan, signed a convention” (Marcel Morabito). Lastly, in-
ternational visits such as the reception of foreign visitors aim to widely disseminate 
the “Minatec concept,” including in less technologically advanced countries, and 
to make the local innovation campus the subject of international benchmarks. This 
ambition is embodied in the creation of the role of director: “I am non-executive. 
I am here to meet delegations interested in this model, and I welcome about one a 
week. I took this post of director because it is an international one. Minatec visitors, 
and especially the Japanese, ask ‘where is the director?’ We communicate at the 
shop-window about Minatec; you have to personalise things.” (Director of Minatec) 
The visits of foreign delegations, while promoting the exchange of information and 
good practices, also promote the potential of the campus by demonstrating it or by 
providing a “commented exhibition” (Rosental 2009, p. 235).44 The dissemination of 
the “Minatec concept” also relies on a formalized offer of expertise whose medium-
term objective is to create “a global network of Minatec-certified R & D centres that 
would share expertise and best practice.”45
Mimetic editing: the borrowing of management tools
While the first two forms of the editing process operate to extend generality 
from one or more examples, the third aims to borrow a management tool to reuse 
it directly in the local context. It is no longer a process used by observers or ad-
visers, but by “operational” actors (managers of national programmes, schemes or 
targeted actions in innovation poles) confronted by a problem and looking for an 
innovative solution. Such actors then use an example for its heuristic value, where 
uncertainty about the best solution tends to favour analogical reasoning (identifica-
tion of similar problems and transposition of adopted solutions) as well as the ex-
perimental dimension of the editing process (testing a technique already identified 
as effective abroad). By definition, the sources of inspiration are very numerous and 
 42  The forums focused on the governance of 
research (2012), its commercialization (2013), 
and new areas of innovation (2014): www.
giant-grenoble.org/en/discover-giant/110-
high-level-week/813-high-level-forum
 43. Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Pasadena, 
USA): NASA laboratory managed by Caltech 
and responsible for the construction and super-
vision of NASA’s unmanned space flights.
 44. Delegations that involve political leaders 
also pursue diplomatic goals. This was the case 
of the visit of the Argentine Minister of Re-
search in March 2014, received by his French 
counterpart, which marked the launch of bilat-
eral cooperation programmes.
 45. Since 2013 minatec has been 
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the choice of a technique implies a certain confidence in its relevance, whether it 
comes from the undisputed leader (the United States) or one that the policy makers 
for nanoS & T at least know how to operate (in the absence of being able to evalu-
ate its effects in its original situation). From then on, they have two ways to identify 
examples they can borrow: firstly, they can imitate a leader—in this case the United 
States—whose success seems to be clearly evident (Haveman 1993); secondly, they 
can import foreign techniques where they are familiar with their operation (resulting 
from their own mobility or from international collaboration).
Firstly, French policy makers may copy two aspects of American policies: they 
identify rules and management tools as long-term success factors for the NNI or 
some of its programmes; they copy alterations in scientific priorities, convinced 
that the United States sets the international tone in this area. On the one hand, they 
borrow certain management tools from the world leader who benefits from several 
years of advance and is therefore supposed to have tested and validated their ef-
fectiveness. In particular, unlike their predecessors, the two leaders of P-Nano from 
2008 to 2012 were inspired by the US policy for nanoS & T to justify the existence 
and ensure the financial sustainability of their programme. They relied on direct 
exchanges with their counterpart at the National Science Foundation as well as on 
the important editing process carried out by American agencies on their strategies, 
via the drafting of strategic agendas or roadmaps: “I did not find such structured 
and explicit strategy documents for other countries. To obtain financing, you have 
to convince Congress and get yourself set up to do the lobbying. And they all have 
these relationships.” (P-Nano Programme Manager 2010–2012).
Unlike the version of the NNI that circulated as a public policy prototype be-
tween 2002 and 2004, P-Nano officials in this case go into the content and the work-
ings of the NNI in order to precisely identify the fiscal and economic dynamics of 
the NNI and its priorities. They were influenced by the transversal structure of the 
NNI to construct the coherence of their policy and justify the level of public invest-
ment in nanoS & T:46 “When I summarized research in Nano at the ANR, I collected 
up all the nano research projects funded from non-targeted programs […] I took the 
entire nanos value chain, just as in the NNI. I consolidated the numbers and included 
infrastructure, basic research and technological or collaborative research. It allowed 
me to recover funding from ANR management by showing that our vision of financ-
ing this vast topic of nanoS & T was really coherent. I was increasing my budget 
every year. Not in the programming phase, but in the negotiation phase.” (P-Nano 
Programme Manager 2007–2009). In addition, they define the specific contribution 
of their programme and legitimize its place in the funding agency47 by positioning 
it on a “technological maturity” scale developed by US agencies.48 The organization 
of technology platforms also involves the importation of certain solutions from the 
 46. The first presentation of this consolidated 
budget appeared in the ANR 2010 call for 
projects.
 47. The nano programme accounted for 
around 50% of the nanoS & T budget consoli-
dated at the ANR level. This presentation could 
no longer fully support the P2N program af-
ter 2010. Its transversal nature weakened it at 
a time when the agency was reducing its the-
matic programmes in favour of the open ended 
“programme”. The annual budget of the nano 
program thus reduced from 40 million euros in 
2008 to 34 in 2009, 33 in 2010, and 22 in 2011.
 48. See the Cahiers de l’ANR concerning Na-
noS & T (2012, p.26). The Technology Readi-
ness Level scale was developed by the US 
Department of Defense and NASA. It defines a 
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American leader. Thus, in the late 2000s, the RTB network harmonised the invoicing 
of its platforms by following its American counterpart:49 “We visited three American 
infrastructures. Our equipment invoicing system was inspired by how they invoice 
for each piece of equipment in the cleanroom. In the beginning, we went astray 
a bit by charging only for the time it was used.” (director of a technology centre 
since 2004). The European Nano-Characterization Laboratory established in 2013 
is directly inspired by the NNI-funded Nanotechnology Characterization Laboratory 
(NCL), whose infrastructure it describes as being its “mirror-image.” Its technical 
and administrative procedures are similar to those of the NCL: “We will need sev-
eral levels of analysis and duplicates for each analysis, so quality control is a real 
headache. They have ten years of experience. During the first two years, we will send 
engineers and technicians there to learn about specific techniques. Training will also 
be provided on the overall management of this infrastructure, and on samples and 
quality-control” (Head of the European Technology Platform for Nanomedicine). 
Nevertheless, the rules of the European Commission dictate that it must be financed 
as a dispersed infrastructure (unlike that of the NCL which is centralized): 
“In the first phase of the project of this nanocharacterization infrastructure, when I came 
back from the United States, I was saying “we’re going to have to copy and paste.” This is 
what I started to negotiate with the Commission as chairman of ETPN [European Technol-
ogy Platform for Nanomedicine]: “we need to build a single site, so where can we put it in 
Europe?” We could have done that in 6 months. But the idea of  making a big centre, to fo-
cus the money, is not what is done in Europe (i.e, the EU). There is always the golden rule: 
it doesn’t matter what the project is, [there must always be] three partners, three countries 
minimum. So we have 7 platforms that exist today, with their buildings and equipment, and 
we are trying to organize ourselves. There is a single point of entry. After that, where will 
my sample go, who will do what, it’s invisible. It’s a black box. It’s as if everything is in the 
same building except that in this case, the sample will go to Switzerland, Norway, England, 
Ireland, Italy, etc.” (Idem).
On the other hand, those in charge of the P-Nano programme pass on certain 
reorientations of American scientific programming. This type of imitation vis-à-vis 
the North American leader comes in the context of conflicting discussions among 
the actors of science policy for nanoS & T as to the definition of tender submis-
sions. Members of the P-Nano sectoral scientific committee defend the definition of 
thematic priorities, while others claim to maintain a “bottom-up” logic of structuring 
scientific communities: “At that time [N.B. in 2009–2010] we tried to define the ar-
eas on which we could put an emphasis. In other words, (to see) whether we are cov-
ering gaps or speeding up areas with big opportunities. Let’s make choices so that 
we can focus our efforts for a long enough period. This rationale was not completely 
shared in the Sector Committee.” (Vice-Chair of the P-Nano Sector Committee in 
2009). Those who defend the strengthening of a rationale for earmarking or targeting 
funds are far from considering the NNI as the model to follow, and they criticize its 
inadequacy in the French context: “One of our issues in 2010 was how to say that 
we had to get out of it [NB: out of following the NNI agenda]. At the French level, 
with limited resources, gaping holes in terms of skills, we had to think about it. We 
were sick of programmes that are useless because they try to do everything. It’s 
the French specialty.” (Chair of the P-Nano Sector Committee from 2007 to 2009). 
Nevertheless, the reference to the North American leader influences certain strategic 
 49. It thus follows the recommendations of the international expert committee (set up by the 






























































The Use of Foreign Examples in Research Policy
330, Revue française de sociologie, 57-3, 2016
directions that the leaders of P-Nano take, convinced that the United States defines 
the international technological agenda.50 In particular, keeping a close eye on the 
NNI agendas confirms, according to them, the relevance of the thematic evolution of 
P-Nano, now renamed Programme Nanosciences, Nanotechnologies et Nanosystems 
(P3N) in 2009: “I reconfigured the programme to give it a nanosystems dimension 
that was missing when we read the NNI strategic agendas. It also took into account 
industrial demands coming from the ministries or manufacturers on the steering 
committee.” (P-Nano Programme Manager 2007–2009).51 This also confirmed the 
need for an application turnaround: “It was noted in a series of documents published 
on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the NNI,52 that the United States had said: 
we have done a lot of upstream research work; now we have to start seeing their ef-
fects. We quickly reorganized our themes to follow this rationale. If the Americans 
see it this way, we cannot escape it either.” (P-Nano Programme Manager 2010–
2012). In 2009, for example, developments in the NNI confirmed the abandonment of 
the objective of structuring communities that had justified the creation of the P-Nano 
program in 2005, as well as the reorientation of the new P3N program towards ap-
plied research. This switch towards applications continued in 201053 because of the 
general policy of the agency. The (more fundamental) theme of nanoscience is now 
attached to the non-specific programme (which now represents 50% of the ANR 
budget) and P3N has become P2N (Nanotechnologies and Nanosystems).
Borrowing from more diversified sources results from the professional expe-
rience of programme managers who thus operate a form of “network bricolage” 
(Baker et al. 2003).54 Consequently these actors are able to spot some foreign solu-
tions quite fortuitously, either as a result of their monitoring or reviewing activities 
in the field, contacts with foreign colleagues or prior professional experience. These 
borrowings are fairly targeted and rely on a relatively detailed knowledge of the 
system. They relate to elements that, like the project evaluation criteria, fit easily 
 50. Members of the sectoral committee of P-
Nano criticized this follow-my-leader attitude 
and perceived a lack of originality in science 
policy: “If you’re not very pro-European, if 
you want to take some distance from things, 
you don’t look close to home. You’ll look at 
the catalogue of our big brother in the United 
States. This is one of the strengths of what 
Roco [N.B. Director of Nano Programmes for 
the NSF and NNI Co-ordinator] did by con-
structing his technological generations [N.B. 
allusion to NNI “roadmaps” that describe po-
tential developments in nanoS & T]. He pro-
vided an intellectual framework for thinking 
about what programmes to have.” (Chairman 
of the P-Nano Sector Committee from 2007 to 
2009).
 51. The references to foreign examples appear 
in the 2009 call for projects: “All the strate-
gic roadmaps today insist on the ‘system’ or 
even ‘system of systems’ dimension that must 
be taken into account.” (Call for Projects 2009, 
p.5).
 52. These documents establish the advent of 
a “nano 2” phase (2011–2020) “dominated by 
an R & D ecosystem driven by socio-economic 
considerations” (Roco et al. 2010, chapter in-
tro., p. 42 ). The Cahiers de l’ANR devoted 
to nanotechnologies (2012, pp. 15–6) uses 
this analysis to introduce the “new era” for 
nanoS & T.
 53. Co-financing by the Directorate Gen-
eral of Armaments (Direction Générale de 
l’Armement), a full partnership programme 
with industry.
 54. Ted Baker et al. (2003, p. 265) define net-
work bricolage as the building of a range of 
instruments from pre-existing networks.
 55. The lack of flexibility of French pro-
gramme managers prevents them from under-
taking more structural reforms: “Roco [N.B. 
the NSF Nano Programme Manager and NNI 
Coordinator] had an envelope of 20% of the 
budget at his discretion. I have proposed this to 
the ANR, but it has always been refused. Be-
fore funding anything, the steering committee 
of the programme must agree. The ISO 9001 
process removes all clientelism but is a bit 
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into the national architecture, while respecting the procedures in place:55 “For the 
calls for projects for the Nano-Innov initiative56, we included patents in the research 
indicators. They required two patents per million euros of grant-funding. I found 
that in the California regional projects when I was doing bibliographic and scientific 
monitoring at the ANR. In Singapore they also are asking for patents in the research 
indicators.” (P-Nano Programme Manager 2007–2009). However, despite the tech-
nical dimension of the measures tested or the circumscribed nature of the changes 
introduced, these experiments do have a political dimension, and their initiators are 
seeking, both at their own level and indirectly, to transform the research system and 
its operating standards. Thus, in the nanoS & T field, the borrowings have more par-
ticularly concerned dimensions of scientific policies for which statements of failure 
were often put forward, such as the “insufficiency” of technological transfer from 
fundamental research: “The researcher is sometimes a little bit in his own ivory 
tower, in the process of gilding the lily. [...] Sometimes, forcing a system changes 
the intellectual paradigm and people are wired differently.” (2007–2009 P-Nano 
programme leader, on the introduction of patent indicators based on California and 
Singapore). Similarly, in terms of science-society relations, a failure of participatory 
experiments of the “public debate” type led the MINATEC leaders to entrust train-
ing and the opening up of laboratories to the “general public” to a director formerly 
responsible for “nanoS & T education” at an American university.57
*
* *
The major international paradigms in terms of research and innovation policy 
play a role in the definition and implementation of the nanoS & T financing policies 
deployed in France in the 2000s (calls for tenders for research projects, infrastruc-
ture financing, creation of local innovation poles). At the scale of this sector, we 
show that the internationalization of science policies is not the product of explicit 
recommendations produced by international actors—which favour isomorphism by 
their coercive action (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) -, but borrowing from examples 
of various geographical origins, among which North American policies are at the 
forefront. Our research shows that the editing processes of different versions of 
examples (Sahlin and Wedlin 2008) is essential to this form of internationalization 
of scientific policies in France, both from the point of view of the identification 
of which international examples to borrow and their inscription in an institutional 
and political context. We differentiate three major editing methods depending on 
the actors involved (editors and “users” of the editorial process), the content of the 
editing and its objectives (from the setting in debate of a policy to the reorienta-
tion of a funding programme). However, these three terms are not mutually ex-
clusive. For example, during a comparative editing process, the description of a 
 56. Nano-Innov was a 70 million euro pro-
gramme launched in 2009 as part of the French 
government’s “Recovery Plan” (Plan de Relance).
 57. The head of the “nano @ school” and 
the “Minatec Summer Programme” has been 
running an educational programme for seven 
years in the United States funded by the 
National Science Foundation (Genin 2011) and 
was deliberately recruited to put similar pro-
jects in place. She was influenced in this by 
her American experience on several points 
(students can experiment on the site; training 
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prototype can illustrate a research project rationale or give substance to the proposed 
concept.58 The search for foreign solutions that motivates mimetic editing can benefit 
from the description of a prototype59 or an earlier comparative editing.60 A com-
parative editing process can produce a new model (or concept) that will inspire 
prototypical or mimetic editing when it is implemented in another national or local 
context.61 In this sense, the editing of foreign examples feeds an incremental evolu-
tion of international models of research and innovation policy, without necessarily 
involving a paradigmatic shift (Hall 1993, p. 282).
This research opens up two lines of reflection on the actors, the mechanisms 
and the contents of the internationalization of science policy. First of all, it allowed 
us to identify the constraints of decontextualization and recontextualisation that 
weigh on the borrowing of foreign examples in scientific policies. In the policies 
for nanoS & T, these constraints are present whether the examples are described as 
prototypes, systematically compared in order to define a concept of public action, or 
copied to borrow a management tool. In all three cases, the process of editing aims 
to solve the paradox that it is difficult, if not impossible, to imitate foreign competi-
tors, but useful, even necessary, to be inspired by them. It allows the examples to 
be used in a purely ceremonial way (Meyer and Rowan 1977) to legitimize policies 
that are also the result of national (or subnational) rationales, or within the produc-
tion of an argument intended to convince investors, either in the implementation of 
a policy. Whatever the circulating content, the edition of foreign examples in a way 
accentuates the isomorphism or formal resemblance between the policies of differ-
ent countries. However, while the first works on institutional isomorphism insisted 
on the socio-political logics that push organizations of the same field to resemble 
each other (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), the processof editing emphasizes the con-
struction, by multiple actors, of the conditions of this isomorphism, the dimensions 
on which the similarity bears, and the uses that are made of it.
Thus, the description of a prototypical example brings to light issues of scientific 
policy (the coordination of initiatives, the pooling of technological means, the en-
couragement of research on the “impacts” of science and technology in the case of 
nanoS & T). The search for similarities then focuses less on public action solutions 
to be imported as a “turnkey” than on new elements of the framing debates around 
the national management of research in the field of nanoS & T (and even beyond) fol-
lowing the launch of the first French programmes. Comparative editing, on the other 
hand, is created from a set of similar examples systematically compared to produce 
a global concept of public action (in this case the concept of “innovation campus”). 
The construction of similarities between the local situation and this global solution 
 58.  We have mentioned earlier that the pro-
moters of the Grenoble innovation pole in 
nanoS & T often cite MIT to illustrate their 
concept of innovation campus.
 59.  One might wonder if the multiple de-
scriptions of the NNI as a prototype for public 
action could also help to reinforce the sense of 
US leadership and the relevance of importing 
North American solutions.
 60.  Thus, the benchmarks conducted within 
the framework of the Grenoble innovation 
poles allow them to identify and import spe-
cific approaches.
 61  Thus the “MINATEC model”, the result 
of a process of comparative editing, became the 
prototype which inspired the creation of com-
petitiveness clusters (Blanc 2004). It also sup-
plies the exchange of best practice within the 
framework of the High Level Forum and the 
supply of services to facilitate its transposition 
(mimetic editing) for emerging countries (for 
the MINATEC-Nanolab product offer, see sec-
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is based on the presentation of a new international environment within which it 
would be necessary to be integrated to remain in the techno-economic competi-
tion. Comparative editing aims to identify a “rational myth” (Hatchuel 1998) and 
representations of success much more than a model to imitate. This rational myth is 
anchored in a very vague formal substratum (the various “components” of the cam-
pus) from which collective dynamics and learning must develop. Finally, mimetic 
editing deals with partial borrowings (a theme from a strategic agenda, a procedural 
element from a call for tenders, a platform organization rule, etc.) from which the 
editors copy the original formulation. This type of importation corresponds to the 
unique situation of mimicry encountered in the case of nanoS & T. It consists in 
drawing on a range of instruments that can be directly transferred—without having 
necessarily been evaluated or systematically compared—and finding their utility 
on a case-by-case basis, depending on the readjustment of the programmes and the 
need to justify their sustainability—in demonstrating, for example, the coherence of 
a transversal programme through consolidation of its budget, or promoting technol-
ogy transfer through patent criteria.
Furthermore, at the scale of the scientific and technological sector, we observe a 
certain complementarity between the three major modes of circulation of the ideas 
identified in the sociological literature (Dobbin et al. 2007). Underpinned by dif-
ferent types of social exchange, they correspond to distinct ways of establishing the 
relevance and legitimacy of the examples that will be edited. The first is a tendency 
to “follow the herd” vis-à-vis the undisputed foreign leader (ibid., P.452). In the 
field of science and technology, as in other fields, the United States has been the 
reference point here since the beginning of the twentieth century (Charle 2003). In 
nanoS & T policies, the influence of this leadership takes two forms: on the one 
hand, US federal policy when represented as a prototype is very present in scientific 
policy debates (but does not influence the decisions taken); on the other hand, pro-
gramme leaders are turning to the United States to import management approaches. 
American examples circulate thanks to the monitoring of their research activity by 
French editors (on the internet, through contacts with US officials or international 
visits) and by their American counterparts, who provide a form of economy in the 
search for information and in the production of arguments. Thus, for nanoS & T, the 
choice of the United States as a leader (rather, for example, than Japan or Germany), 
comes partly from the information constraints that weigh on editors.62 A second 
mechanism in the international circulation of nanoS & T policies is the “theorization 
of solutions by experts” (Dobbin et al. 2007, p.453), which favours normative iso-
morphism, in other words a compliance with the practices and ideas of collaborating 
and competing countries (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The analysis in terms of edit-
ing processes highlights how these experts—in the policies for nanoS & T, strategy 
and as communication advisers—construct the similarity between peers, notably by 
systematically comparing foreign examples with a view to benchmarking and the 
identification with a “club” (comprising the world’s major hubs in nanoS & T). While 
 62. As evidenced in particularr by the search for examples of “editable” foreign policies (because 
already “edited” by their promoters): “Despite the profusion of documents, it is impossible to 
make quantitative comparisons: the documents only offer partial visions, the data do not cover the 
same elements, the share of personnel costs varies considerably. The scope of the task that aims to 
compile a quantitative synthesis including researchers involved, infrastructure, etc. is such that no 
scientific department of an embassy that had been asked to do this wanted to make this synthesis 
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the comparative editing of the examples allows the ideas (the concept of innovation 
campus) to circulate without direct contact, it also reinforces a club rationale that 
facilitates, in return, direct contacts between its members (world-class innovation 
campuses). Finally, a last form of circulation is the adoption of a foreign system in 
use in what is seen as a similar situation (Dobbin et al. 2007, p.453). The analysis 
in terms of editing emphasizes here the power of mimicry, since indecision over 
the best solution as well as the relatively technical character of the problem being 
encountered both favour analogical reasoning (identification of similar problems 
and the search for solutions which work elsewhere). In this case the editors are 
those responsible for programmes, medium-sized agencies or technology platforms 
that borrow examples on the basis of their personal networks or experience. Thus 
practices circulate for reasons of structural homology (Burt 1987) or through direct 
contacts. If the identification of the system can be rather fortuitous, its importation 
supposes a sufficiently precise knowledge, as well as an appreciation, on the part of 
the person in charge, of its relevance and its effects.
Although we have been primarily concerned with the scientific policies con-
ducted in France in the context of this article, several observations lead us to argue 
that this form of internationalization is not specific to the latter, but is also operating 
in others national contexts. Thus, while the description of the NNI as a prototype for 
public action uses the old argument of the “French lag” vis-à-vis the United States 
to plead in favour of a major programme (Bouchard 2007), a reference to this “lag” 
is also very obvious in other national and European documents,63 and testifies to the 
more general importance of the American example in the science policy debates in 
the field of nanoS & T.64 Moreover, the definition and implementation of the interna-
tional concept of innovation campus can be interpreted as the deployment, in France, 
of a form of internationalization of scientific policies much in evidence abroad—in 
particular through the intermediary of consulting firms in technological manage-
ment65—and also motivated by the concern for a “national catch-up” on a mode of 
organization present in technologically advanced countries.66 Lastly, the recurrent 
exchanges between programme managers in several countries67 also underline that 
the search for “best practice” among professional networks is a quite widely-shared 
concern among these actors, and that it is not limited to the French case.
 63.  In addition, the reference to the United 
States appears twenty times in the European 
Commission’s Communication “Towards a Eu-
ropean strategy for nanoS & T”, 12 May 2004, 
30 p.
 64.  In these debates, the reference to the ex-
ample of the NNI is all the more central since 
its launch came at a time when the vision of the 
predominantly economic role of science and 
technology was becoming stronger in Europe 
(the Lisbon European Strategy on the “Knowl-
edge Economy” was launched in 2000) and in 
the United States (Johnson 2004).
 65.  For example, the International Triple He-
lix Institute founded by Henry Etzkowitz. He 
theorized the dynamic interactions between 
public authorities, scientists and industrialists 
as a “Triple Helix” (see note 14) and works with 
science parks, public authorities, companies 
and universities: http://www.triplehelix.net/.
 66.  See the Minatec-Nanolab proposals for 
emerging countries (section on comparative 
editing).
 67.  Bilateral exchanges initiated to strengthen 
inter-agency collaboration on certain pro-
grammes (such as the European Research 
Area Networks—ERA-NET—tenders jointly 
launched by several national agencies); or 
broader exchanges organized by international 
bodies for reflections and lobbying on science 
policy (for example, the “Science Europe” as-
sociation, which brings together representatives 
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